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In the face of rising old-age dependency ratios in industrialized coun-
tries like Germany, politicians and their electorates discuss the loosen-
ing of immigration policies as one policy option to ensure the sustain-
ability of public social security systems. The question arises whether
this policy option is feasible in aging countries: older individuals are
typically found to be more averse to immigration. However, cross-
sectional investigations may confound age with cohort eects. This
investigation uses the 1999-2008 waves of the German Socio-Economic
Panel to separate the eect of age on immigration attitudes from co-
hort and also from time eects. Over the life cycle stated immigration
concerns are predicted to increase well into retirement and decrease
afterward. Relative to other issues, immigration concerns are found
to actually decrease over the life cycle.
JEL classication: D78, F22, J10
Keywords: Immigration, Demographic Change, Political Economy
RWTH Aachen University, Faculty of Business and Economics, Templergraben 64,
52062 Aachen, Germany, phone: ++49 241 80 93 93 1, email: lena.calahorrano@rwth-
aachen.de.
yThis research project was sponsored by the German Research Foundation (DFG). I
thank participants of the 2010 SOEP User Conference for their helpful comments.1 Introduction
Rising old-age dependency ratios in industrialized countries like Germany
pose a challenge to the viability of public pension and health systems. The
loosening of immigration policies is often seen as one policy option to counter
this challenge. The United Nations report on replacement migration (UNPD
(2001)) calculates that in order to keep the ratio of 15 to 64 year olds to over
64 year olds in the 15 old European Union countries constant until 2050,
immigration would have to be more than 60 times its forecast. Such a huge
increase in immigration is clearly unrealistic. However, other investigations
have shown that even modest increases in immigration can have positive scal
impacts, especially if immigrants are selected according to age and skill, see,
for instance, Storesletten (2000) or Bonin et al. (2000).
As Rodrik (1995) argues, ultimately, voters' individual preferences are
key to policy outcomes in any democracy.1 In countries with aging popu-
lations, older individuals' attitudes should play an increasingly important
role in shaping policy. This paper looks at the impact of age (and other
characteristics correlated with age) on individual attitudes toward immigra-
tion. It uses a large representative panel survey, the German Socioeconomic
Panel (SOEP). The sample is limited to those individuals eligible to vote,
i.e. adults with German nationality.
Previous empirical investigations of the determinants of immigration at-
titudes have found negative or hump-shaped eects of age, without distin-
guishing life cycle from cohort or time eects, however. In any cross section,
an individual's age and birth year are perfectly correlated. Yet they may
have dierential eects on attitudes toward immigration. For instance, a
negative estimated eect of age on immigration attitudes is consistent with
individuals growing more averse to immigration over the life cycle. But it is
also consistent with older cohorts of individuals being less open toward im-
migrants, and growing older not having any eect on immigration attitudes
at all.
In any time series in contrast, the eect of growing older on attitudes
would be confounded with time eects. An increase in an individuals's op-
position to immigration from one period to the next could be attributed to
the fact that the individual has grown older or to changes in macroeconomic
circumstances. Consequently, panel data are necessary to isolate the eect
of growing older from cohort and time eects.
This paper follows two approaches to isolate the eect of age in an un-
1A recent publication modeling the mapping of individual immigration attitudes to
immigration policy outcomes is Facchini and Mayda (2008).
1balanced panel of German voters. Firstly, it includes year of birth or dummy
variables for survey year as explanatory variables in addition to age. Sec-
ondly, models which only use the within variation of the data, the variation
in time for each individual, are estimated.
Whereas individuals living in areas with low local birth rates have been
found to be less averse to immigration (see Ivlevs 2008), the present investi-
gation nds mixed evidence for the political feasibility of policies aiming at
increasing immigration as a country is aging. On the one hand, predicted
concerns about immigration (based on the estimation sample) decrease only
past age 70. On the other hand, relative to other areas of concern, pre-
dicted immigration becomes less prominent over the life cycle, whereas it is
more prominent among older than among younger generations of individu-
als in the sample. Survey year is signicant, with individuals most worried
about immigration when unemployment is high. There is no time trend in
predicted immigration concerns nor in the impact that dierent respondent
characteristics have on immigration concerns.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 summarizes
previous ndings on the political economy of immigration and on the deter-
minants of immigration attitudes. The data and the empirical approach are
introduced in section 3. Section 4 discusses the results. Section 5 summarizes
the most important ndings and outlines directions for further research.
2 Background and Related Literature
Theoretical research suggests that on economic grounds old individuals should
be more open to immigration than younger ones. Assuming that immigration
is predominantly labor migration, immigrants can be considered to be substi-
tutes to workers and complements to (older) capital owners. The translation
of heterogeneous interests among natives endowed with dierent amounts of
capital into immigration policies is modeled by Benhabib (1996) and Mazza
and van Winden (1996) for instance.
In addition to beneting from an increase in capital returns, the closer
an individual gets to the end of her life cycle the less she should be worried
about immigrant workers who potentially have a higher number of ospring
than natives changing the political balance in the future. The role of immi-
gration in shaping the political balance plays a prominent role in dynamic
political-economy models of immigration, see, e.g., Dolmas and Human
(2004), Ortega (2005, 2010) and Sand and Razin (2007).
The conjecture that older natives are the ones who benet from immigra-
tion is subject to some caveats, however. Firstly, the scope for immigration
2to have an impact on factor returns diminishes when the movement of capital
and goods is taken into account, see Hillman and Weiss (1999) and Calahor-
rano and an de Meulen (2009). However, there is evidence for negative eects
of immigration on wages and/or employment, documented, for example, by
Borjas (2003) and Angrist and Kugler (2003).
Secondly, the impact of immigration on consumption levels is also miti-
gated by pay-as-you-go pensions and contingent on the design of the pension
system, see, e.g., Scholten and Thum (1996), Haupt and Peters (1998) and
Calahorrano (2010). With exible benets, immigration has no eect on
contributions and an ambiguous eect on benets since it has osetting ef-
fects on current wages and on the number of contributors to social security.
With xed pension benets, native workers benet from sharing the burden
of pension contributions with immigrant workers.
Thirdly, immigrants who do not nd employment are a scal burden on
the welfare state and thus for natives of all ages. In this case, the design of
the welfare system determines whether individuals with high or low incomes
are most aected, as Facchini and Mayda (2009) explain.
Finally, immigration attitudes are shaped by non-economic as well as
economic motives, and it is likely that these non-economic eects vary by
age. For instance, older individuals may be more wary of change in general
or more opposed to changes in social norms and customs.
In the last 15 years, a number of investigations have addressed labor mar-
ket, welfare state and non-economic concerns. For the US, Espenshade and
Hempstead (1996) and Citrin et al. (1997) test various hypotheses about
the factors inuencing immigration attitudes, using a CBS News / New York
Times poll and the National Election Study, respectively. Both studies doc-
ument a signicant link between education and immigration attitudes: more
educated individuals are less likely to favor reducing the number of admitted
immigrants.2
This nding has two possible explanations. Firstly, education is likely
to enhance tolerance or a group norm of tolerance. Secondly, in line with
the predictions of neoclassical labor market models, high skilled natives are
complements rather than substitutes to immigrants. This is the case if immi-
grants are less skilled than natives (or if there are increasing returns to scale
to skilled labor as argued in World Bank 2008). The nding is in line with
the results of virtually all other investigations. Additionally, several authors
nd evidence for the validity of the second explanation: education plays a
larger role for those in the labor force than those outside the labor force, see,
2However, in the poll data, individuals who dropped out of high school were even less
likely to favor reducing the number of immigrants.
3e.g., Kessler (2001), Scheve and Slaughter (2001) and O'Rourke and Sinnott
(2006).
Scheve and Slaughter (2001) systematically test the predictions of various
international economy models concerning the distributional eects of immi-
gration (and thus immigration preferences), with data from the US National
Election Study. They nd strong support for the Heckscher-Ohlin3 model
and the factor-proportions analysis model, which predict an opposition of
low skilled native workers to low skilled immigration but not for the so called
area-analysis model, which assumes geographically segmented labor markets.
Mayda (2006) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) conduct similar anal-
yses based on cross-country data, presuming that the estimated impact of
skill on immigration attitudes should be contingent on the shares of high
and low skilled workers in the population: being high skilled should have
a stronger impact in countries with a high share of high skilled, attracting
predominantly low skilled immigrants. The authors' results bear out this
presumption.
Additionally, education plays a minor role in countries with an unequal
income distribution, see O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006). Due to a high skill
premium these countries can be assumed to attract skilled migrants. Fur-
thermore, individuals in occupations with a high share of foreign workers are
more likely to oppose immigration, see Mayda (2006).
Dustmann and Preston (2005) and Facchini and Mayda (2009) simulta-
neously model the impact of immigration on the labor market and on the
welfare state. Facchini and Mayda (2009) predict that if welfare taxes rather
than benets are exible, in richer countries (typically characterized by low
skilled immigration) skill should have a positive impact on immigration pref-
erences and income a negative one. The reverse should be true for poorer
countries. Since skill and income are highly positively correlated, the esti-
mated income coecient is signicantly positive when skills are not accounted
for. However, when Facchini and Mayda (2009) include both variables and
their interactions with per capita GDP, the predictions of the model with
exible welfare taxes and xed benets are conrmed.
Using data from the European Social Survey, Dustmann and Preston
(2005) nd that scal concerns matter more than labor market concerns.
Facchini and Mayda (2009) reach less clear conclusions based on data from
the International Social Survey Program. The importance of scal concerns
is also shown by Dustmann and Preston (2007), based on British data. Mean-
3According to the Heckscher-Ohlin model, large immigration \shocks" may induce lower
wages because a dierent set of goods is produced, whereas small shocks only alter the
produced quantities of the dierent goods.
4while, cross-country dierences are also the focus of Bauer et al. (2000), who
show that these dierences cannot be ascribed to respondents' characteristics
but are largely due to dierent immigration policies.
Individuals' attitudes toward immigration may further be aected by
their preference for homogeneous social norms and customs, as in Hillman
(2002). Dustmann and Preston (2007) show that in Britain opposition to im-
migration increases with ethnic and cultural distance to immigrants. Several
other studies document the importance of non-economic factors in shaping
immigration attitudes (Espenshade and Hempstead 1996, Chandler and Tsai
2001, Kessler 2001, Gang et al. 2002 and Mayda 2006 among others). Chan-
dler and Tsai (2001) nd that besides education, perceived cultural threats
were the most important factor and Mayda (2006) nds that non-economic
factors explained a larger share of the variance in attitudes than economic
factors. Tucci (2005) discusses the \contact hypothesis", which assumes that
contact with immigrants reduces prejudice.
Two recent studies on immigration attitudes explicitly take into account
the role of population aging, see Ivlevs (2008) and Facchini et al. (2011).
Linking survey data from Latvia and the Ukraine to data on local birth
rates, Ivlevs (2008) shows that individuals living in areas with low birth
rates are less opposed to immigration. He presumes that local birth rates
aect perceptions of national demographics and thereby perceptions of the
necessity to make up for smaller cohorts of native workers by recruiting im-
migrant workers. In an ongoing research project Facchini et al. (2011) are
comparing the link between age and immigration attitudes across countries.
Virtually all other investigations include individual age as a control vari-
able. Most investigations nd a negative age eect, see, for instance, Chan-
dler and Tsai (2001) for the US, Tucci (2005) for Germany, and Facchini
and Mayda (2009) using the International Social Survey Program. However,
also using the International Social Survey Program, Bauer et al. (2000) nd
that older people are more likely to think that immigrants are good for the
economy, which is in line with labor market models.
Additionally, Brenner (2007) documents a sign change in the estimated
coecients of dierent age groups after accounting for family-xed eects,
whereas Miguet (2008) estimates a positive eect of age on votes cast for
anti-immigration policies in 1988 but a U-shaped eect of age in 2000.
A reverse U-shaped (hump-shaped) age eect on opposition to immigra-
tion is found in some other papers, for instance, in Espenshade and Hemp-
stead (1996) with individuals most opposed between ages 24 and 45, and in
Ivlevs (2008) with individuals most opposed between ages 50 in regions with
low birth rates and 87 in regions with high birth rates. Although O'Rourke
and Sinnott (2006) estimate a hump-shaped eect of age, they nd that
5predicted opposition would only decrease beyond age 100.
The estimated eect of age thus appears to be highly sensitive to the
functional form imposed and to the included covariates. The present analysis
attempts to include in the estimations all relevant variables correlated with
age, such as income, wealth, health and life satisfaction. Additionally, it
attempts to disentangle age from cohort and time eects. Due to the panel
dimension of the data used, it is possible to include year of birth or time
dummies as explanatory variables in addition to age. As an alternative, a
model which only uses the within variation of the data is estimated.
3 Data and Empirical Specication
Most previous analyses of immigration attitudes use cross-sectional data. In
order to identify the eect of growing older on immigration attitudes and
to isolate it from the eect of belonging to a given cohort, it is, however,
necessary to use panel data.
The present analysis is based on data from the 2008 release of the SOEP
for the years 1999 to 2008.4 The SOEP is a large representative panel survey,
conducted on an annual basis, in which respondents have been asked about
their attitudes toward immigration since 1999. It consists of several subsam-
ples, starting with the original sample drawn in 1984. Refreshment samples
were drawn in subsequent years to compensate for sample attrition. How-
ever, attrition is limited: out of the originally interviewed 5;921 households
comprising 12;245 individuals, 3;154 households and 5;626 individuals were
still interviewed in 2008.5
Three subsamples deliberately oversample certain groups of the popu-
lation. Whereas the \high income" sample was excluded for the present
analysis, respondents from the two immigrant samples were included if they
had acquired German nationality. Since the analysis focuses on the voting
population, it also excludes individuals below age 18 (the voting age). Out
of the remaining 181;326 person-year observations, two were excluded be-
cause of missing information on their year of birth and 1;496 (less than 1%)
because of missing information on their attitudes toward immigration. The
baseline sample thus consists of 179;828 (person-year) observations.
The variable of interest is constructed from the question \What is your
4The data used in this paper were extracted using the Add-On package PanelWhiz
for Stata. PanelWhiz (http://www.PanelWhiz.eu) was written by Dr. John P. Haisken-
DeNew (john@PanelWhiz.eu). See Haisken-DeNew and Hahn (2006) for details. Any data
or computational errors in this paper are my own.
5For a detailed data description see Wagner, Frick, and Schupp (2007).
6attitude toward the following areas - are you concerned about them?", where
one of the mentioned areas is immigration to Germany. The possible an-
swers to this question are ordinal, ranging from very concerned, somewhat
concerned to not concerned.6 For the empirical analysis, the answers are
coded 3, 2, and 1, respectively, such that higher values correspond to more
concerns.
There is quite some variation in the given answers, between individu-
als and across time. Tables 1 and 2 display some summary statistics for the
question \Are you concerned about immigration to Germany?". Overall 31%
of the answers in the sample were \very concerned", 46% were \somewhat
concerned" and 23% were \not concerned". However, almost 58% of respon-
dents said at least once that they were very concerned, while 48% were not
concerned at least once. Out of those somewhat concerned, about 58% were
always somewhat concerned.
Immigration Concerns Overall At Least Once Always
very concerned 31:12 57:58 53:29
somewhat concerned 45:95 78:76 57:63
not concerned 22:93 48:31 49:53
Percent of very concerned, somewhat concerned and not concerned answers in the
estimation sample. Percent of respondents who stated to be very concerned, some-
what concerned and not concerned at least once. Percent of respondents who always
stated to be very concerned, somewhat concerned and not concerned.
Table 1: Shares of Immigration Concerns
The share of those who were very concerned in one year and not concerned
in the next is very low, see table 2. The same holds for the transition from
being not concerned to being very concerned. About 33% of respondents who
were either very concerned or not concerned said that they were somewhat
concerned in the following year.
There is no natural scale for measuring immigration concerns. The origi-
nal SOEP question allows respondents to choose between three ordered cat-
egories. The distance between any two categories need not be equal (or
meaningful at all). However, one can think of stated immigration concerns
depending on latent continuous concerns about immigration. With y
it as
6Tucci (2005) and Brenner (2007) have used this variable for analyzing attitudes toward
immigration.
7very somewhat not
Immigration Concerns concerned concerned concerned
very concerned 61:45 33:24 5:31
somewhat concerned 21:53 61:27 17:20
not concerned 6:90 33:26 59:83
Percent of respondents with a given stated concern in one period who stated to be
very concerned, somewhat concerned and not concerned in the next period.
Table 2: Transitions for Immigration Concerns
latent concerns and yit as stated concerns, it holds that
y

it =  + x
0





1 if  1 < y
it  1





Respondents state that they are \somewhat concerned" if their latent
concern exceeds some threshold 1 and state that they are \very concerned"
if their latent concern exceeds a higher threshold, 2. The parameters , 
and  = (1;2)' can then be chosen such as to maximize the likelihood of
observing the sample on hand. This requires an assumption on the distri-
bution of "i. Assuming a standard normal distribution function results in
the ordered probit model, whereas assuming a standard logistic distribution
function results in the ordered logit model. To identify the dierent parame-
ter values, an additional normalization constraint is necessary. A commonly
imposed constraint (applied also in this investigation) is to set  equal to
zero. The eect of the constant is then absorbed into the thresholds .
Due to the panel dimension of the data, age and year of birth or age and
dummy variables for survey year can simultaneously be included in the vector
of explanatory variables xit. An alternative approach to isolate the eect
of individual age is to estimate a transformed model, based on the within
variation only (the variation in time for each individual). However, there are
to date no pre-programed routines to incorporate this kind of transformation
into ordered models. Therefore, the following transformed model is estimated
by OLS:
yit    yi +  y =  + (xit    xi +  x)
0  + ("it    "i +  ") : (3)
Besides identifying the eect of age on immigration attitudes over the
life-cycle, this model has the advantage that it eliminates any time-constant
8individual heterogeneity which may be correlated with observable individual
characteristics included in xit. Equation (3) thus corresponds to a xed
eects (FE) model.
The SOEP includes information on additional areas people may be con-
cerned about. Respondents are asked some questions with regard to their
own situation (their economic situation, their health and their job security,
given that they were employed) and several questions on macro issues (gen-
eral economic development, environmental protection, maintaining peace,
crime in Germany and hostility toward foreigners in Germany). Since 2004,
the SOEP also includes concerns about the enlargement of the European
Union to the east, and since 2008 it includes concerns about terrorism.
Table 5 in the appendix compares summary statistics for all categories of
concerns. On average, respondents are most worried about crime, economic
development and maintaining peace and least worried about their own situ-
ation. Note that immigration concerns have the largest standard deviation
among all concerns. Stated immigration concerns thus reect more than
general worries.
However, the age pattern in average concerns is quite similar to the age
pattern of immigration concerns as described below, see the left panel of
gure 1. Consequently, it is important to avoid confounding a life cycle
eect on opposition to immigration with a life cycle eect on general worries
or life satisfaction. In fact, life satisfaction has been shown to follow a U-
shaped pattern in age, see, for instance, Clark, Oswald, and Warr (1996) and
Blanchower and Oswald (2008).
Both life satisfaction and other areas of concerns are thus included as
controls in the regressions. As a robustness check, estimation results exclud-
ing other areas of concerns are presented. An alternative approach is using
the dierence between stated immigration concerns and other areas of stated
concerns as a measure of immigration attitudes. Both measures are proxies
for \true" immigration attitudes.
The left panel of gure 1 shows mean immigration concerns by age. It
reveals a hump-shaped correlation, with opposition to immigration at its
strongest among the 70 year olds, and a lot of variation past age 85, prob-
ably due to the low number of observations. This panel also plots the age
prole of an index of concerns with respect to the other areas, excluding EU
enlargement, terrorism and job security, which were not asked of all respon-
dents in all ten years.
The right panel of gure 1 isolates the correlation between year of birth
and immigration concerns. It seems to be the case that those born around
1930 are most concerned about immigration. However, the hump shape
exhibits far more variation than the one plotted in the left panel, except for
9Figure 1: Immigration Concerns as a Function of Age and Year of Birth
The gures show mean concerns by age and by year of birth. \Immigration" denotes concerns about
immigration to Germany. \Index" denotes average concerns over the following categories: economic devel-
opment, the environment, world peace, crime, the situation of foreigners in Germany and the respondent's
own economic situation and health.
very old cohorts.7
Additionally, there is quite some time variation in mean immigration atti-
tudes, see gure 2. Immigration concerns reach a peak in 2005, which is also
the year with the highest unemployment rate in the time frame considered.
Contrary to Gang et al. (2002), who document an increase in opposition to
immigration from 1988 to 1997, the ten periods observed in the SOEP do
not suggest a time trend.
Table 6 in the appendix shows summary statistics for the other explana-
tory variables included in xit. The theoretical background sketched above
presumes that individuals who draw social security incomes and who own
(nancial) assets are more likely to be in favor of immigration. Income vari-
ables are taken from the SOEP's cross-national equivalent les, which con-
tain imputed values easily comparable to income data from other data sets.
Household income is used instead of personal income such as labor income
in order to avoid limiting the sample to recipients of certain kinds of income.
It is deated using a price index for 2006. Furthermore, an equivalent house-
hold income (not shown in table 6) is computed by adjusting for the number
7Indeed, although the estimated eect of birth year is quite strong in all regressions,
its sign turns out not to be not robust.
10Figure 2: Immigration Concerns and Unemployment Rate as a Function of
Survey Year
Source: Bundesagentur f ur Arbeit (2011): Unemployment rate in the civilian labor force
of household members, using the following formula8:
adjusted income =
income
1 + 0:5  (adults   1) + 0:3  kids
:
SOEP respondents are asked about dierent kinds of incomes, but missing
values are not imputed for all income variables. Therefore, dummy variables
indicating whether an individual has a certain kind of income or asset, which
have fewer missing values, are used in most estimations. 46% of respondents
receive some public benet. 11% declared not to own any assets, including
a savings account. Individuals were asked specically about nancial assets
in 2002 and 2006 only. Out of those observations 48% have some nancial
assets.
In addition to years of education, the SOEP provides education data
categorized according to the UNESCO's international standard classication
of education (ISCED), where those still in education are assigned a value of
0. The denition of categories 1 to 6 can be found in table 7 in the appendix.
Categories 3 to 5 are further aggregated into a \medium education" dummy,
whereas categories 1 and 2 on the one hand and 6 on the other hand then
correspond to low and high education, respectively.
8This is the so called \OECD modied equivalence scale".
11Further controls include gender, marital status, the number of kids living
in the household, whether a respondent lives in East or West Germany, immi-
gration background9 and labor force status. Furthermore, political interest
is included, with 1 meaning very strong and 4 none at all, as are the number
of doctor visits in the three months prior to the interview as a measure for
health or reliance on the health system.
Table 3 shows the correlation coecients between age and various other
variables. Older individuals have lower household incomes, even after ac-
counting for the number of household members and they are less likely to
receive public benets other than pensions. However, they are more likely
to own assets and their nancial assets are worth more. They are less satis-
ed with life and worry more, and they also rely more heavily on the health
system.
Age Correlation Coecient
Equivalent HH income  0:27
HH receives no benets 0:43
HH owns no assets  0:02
Owns nancial assets 0:21
Value nancial assets 0:10
Life satisfaction  0:06
Index of concerns 0:10
Doctor visits 0:19
Equivalent household income is real household income, ad-
justed for the number of household members. Benets include
family allowances, unemployment benets, care benets and
welfare, but not pensions. Assets include savings accounts,
building savings contracts, life insurance, bonds, stock and
rm capital. The index of concerns is the average value of
concerns asked in all years to all respondents. The number
of doctor visits in the three months prior to the interview is
reported.
Table 3: Correlation of Age with Other Variables
The next section extensively discusses results based on stated immigration
concerns. This is the obvious measure for immigration attitudes. However,
the regression results show that the estimated impact of some explanatory
variables on immigration concerns is highly sensitive to whether additional
concerns are included as controls. Including these other areas of concern may
imply endogeneity problems whereas excluding them may induce an omitted
9It is likely that a large share of the immigrants in the voting population sample are
descendants of Germans who automatically received citizenship upon immigration. Out
of the 2;090 observations with an immigrant background and valid answers on whether
they had a foreign parent only 51% stated to have a foreign parent.
12variable bias. The dierence between immigration and other concerns as a
measure for immigration attitudes does not suer from these problems and
is also discussed.
4 Results
Firstly, the estimation results for stated immigration concerns using ordered
models are presented and compared to the estimation results using OLS.
Whereas a rst set of estimations includes time dummies in addition to age,
a second set of estimations includes year of birth instead. Several robustness
checks are discussed. Secondly, the results of estimating a pooled OLS model
of stated immigration concerns are compared to the results from exploiting
the within variation of the data only. Since time-invariant variables cancel
out of the model in equation (3), only time-variant variables are used in
both models in order to make the results comparable. Thirdly, the dier-
ence between immigration and other concerns is introduced as an alternative
measure for immigration attitudes.
Stated Immigration Concerns: Ordered vs. Linear Mod-
els
As a rst step, a regression model with a full set of covariates, including time
dummies, is estimated by pooled OLS, ordered probit and ordered logit.
Age, age squared, age to the power of three and age to the power of four are
included because in regressions without other controls these rst four powers
proved to be signicant. Table 8 in the appendix contains a comparison of
the regression results for these models.
The age terms are jointly but not individually signicant in all three
models when accounting for a full set of covariates. It is remarkable that age
still has an independent eect on immigration concerns, even though a host
of variables correlated with age like income and life satisfaction are controlled
for. Compared to 1999, individuals were less concerned about immigration
in all years but 2005, the year with the highest unemployment rate in the
sample period.
Since the eect of age on immigration concerns is highly non-linear, it is
best illustrated visually.10 Figure 3, based on the ordered probit model, shows
the predicted probabilities of not being concerned, being somewhat concerned
and being very concerned about immigration for dierent ages, for a male
10The corresponding gure for the ordered logit model is available upon request.
13married respondent from West Germany who has no migration background,
medium education, is working, does not receive any state benets and owns
some kind of assets. Other variables are set to their means.11
Ceteris paribus, predicted immigration concerns increase slightly with
age. Across all ages, the predicted probability of being somewhat concerned
is highest and the probability of not being concerned lowest. The probability
of being very concerned increases slightly up to age 70 and then decreases
markedly. The reverse pattern is observed for the probability of not being
concerned. Immigration concerns thus seem to increase as individuals ap-
proach retirement and decrease only as they approach the end of their lives.
Figure 3: Eect of Age on the Predicted Probabilities for Immigration Con-
cerns, Ordered Probit Including Time Dummies
Simulations with Clarify based on table 8, ordered probit model. Results for the ordered logit model are
available upon request. To simulate the probabilities continuous variables were set to their means. Other
covariates were set to male, married, from West Germany, no immigrant, medium education (ISCED
3/4/5), working, not receiving any state benets but owning some kind of assets.
However, being retired instead of working has no signicant eect on
immigration attitudes, see table 8. Neither do unemployed individuals voice
more concerns, which is in line with the literature. Individuals who are in
education, working irregularly or not in the labor force are less concerned
about immigration. For the rst and last group labor market competition
11Both the mean probabilities in gures 3 and 4 and the statistics in table 4 were
simulated using the Stata program Clarify, see Tomz, Wittenberg, and King (2003). The
usefulness of these simulations is demonstrated in King, Tomz, and Wittenberg (2000).
14from potential immigrants is obviously not an issue. Furthermore, individuals
from all three groups are likely to have low incomes and therefore pay low
welfare state contributions. If an increase in welfare costs due to immigration
entails higher contributions rather than lower benets, it makes sense that
individuals with low incomes are less concerned.
This presumption is conrmed by the signicantly positive coecient of
household income: individuals in households with higher (equivalent) in-
comes are more concerned about immigration. Individuals who do not them-
selves benet from any kind of state support and individuals who rely rela-
tively little on the health system, proxied by the number of doctor visits, are
also more concerned.
Labor market competition from immigrants seems to be more of an issue
for natives with low education, who are signicantly more concerned than
those who have not yet completed their education, the reference category.
Highly educated natives are signicantly less concerned while those with
medium education do not dier signicantly from those who have not yet
completed their education. This result is in line with labor market concerns
about actual immigration patterns in Germany (immigrants have on average
lower education than natives), but also with political correctness among the
highly educated, as argued above.
The hypothesis that individuals with capital holdings favor immigration
(presumably because it implies an increase in labor supply) is also conrmed.
Individuals who do not own any assets are signicantly more concerned about
immigration than those who do own some assets. Admittedly, the dummy for
household asset ownership is a very crude measure for wealth or capital hold-
ings. The impact of other wealth indicators is discussed below, conrming
the result that wealthy individuals are less opposed to immigration.
Immigrant workers, although nationalized, tend to be most negatively
aected by further immigration, see for instance Ottaviano and Peri (2008).
However, they can also be expected to have the smallest cultural distance to
new immigrants. Since Dustmann and Preston (2007) nd cultural distance
to be a powerful predictor of opposition to immigration it is not surprising
that immigrants state signicantly less concerns.
Quite remarkable is the nding that being East German reduces concerns
about immigration. In fact, East Germans are on average more concerned
than West Germans, and the dierence is signicant. Living in the East has a
positive eect on immigration concerns in univariate regressions. The eect
of living in the East changes its sign when controlling for other concerns.
This implies that the opposition of East Germans to immigration is due
to dierent (observable) characteristics. Most importantly, East German
respondents are generally more concerned than West German respondents,
15and East Germans with the same level of average concerns as West Germans
are at least less likely to voice concerns about immigration.
In general, those who worry more also worry more about immigration,
with the exception of concerns about the environment and world peace, two
issues about which individuals on the left of the political spectrum are more
likely to worry.12 Concerns about crime are the strongest predictor of con-
cerns about immigration, followed by concerns about general economic devel-
opment. Concerns about one's own economic situation are far less important,
a result also in line with the literature, see, e.g., Citrin et al. (1997).
The estimation results for these respondent characteristics are similar
when including year of birth as a control variable instead of the time dum-
mies. Therefore, table 9 only shows the estimated coecients for the age
terms and for year of birth. Before examining dierences in the estimated
age pattern of immigration concerns compared to gure 3, the quantitative
importance of selected other variables is discussed based on table 4. This
table reports the predicted probability of not being concerned, being some-
what concerned and being very concerned about immigration for the model
which includes year of birth as a control. These predicted probabilities are
calculated for a male married respondent from West Germany who has no
migration background, medium education, is working, does not receive any
state benets and owns some kind of assets, whereas other variables are set
to their means.
Economic variables like income and asset ownership turn out to have quite
a weak eect on immigration concerns. Reliance on the health system is more
important, and the eect of a change in labor force status from \working" to
\in education" is also stronger, see table 4. Education has an even stronger
eect, with the highly educated 11 percentage points more likely not to be
concerned and 15 percentage points less likely to be very concerned than those
with low education. The strong negative eect of immigration background on
concerns about immigration clearly mandates a cultural rather than economic
interpretation. It is about as strong as the eect of education. Meanwhile,
the eect of life satisfaction is quite weak.
The four age terms are still jointly but not individually signicant, see
table 9. However, there is a sign change in the estimated coecient for age,
which is now positive. The estimated coecient for year of birth is also
positive, indicating that ceteris paribus younger cohorts are more averse to
immigration. Table 4 shows a pronounced dierence between the youngest
and oldest cohort in the sample: ceteris paribus the youngest individuals
12Surprisingly, the same does not hold for being concerned about the situation of for-
eigners in Germany.
16Change Probability Probability Probability
from of not being of being somewhat of being very
Variable to concerned concerned concerned
East German no 0:011 0:007  0:018
yes (0:003) (0:002) (0:005)
[0:006;0:016] [0:004;0:011] [ 0:027; 0:009]
Immigrant no 0:113 0:029  0:141
yes (0:006) (0:002) (0:006)
[0:100;0:124] [0:025;0:033] [ 0:153; 0:129]
Education low 0:110 0:041  0:151
high (0:005) (0:003) (0:006)
[0:100;0:120] [0:035;0:047] [ 0:164; 0:138]
Labor working 0:057 0:026  0:082
force status in education (0:007) (0:002) (0:009)
[0:043;0:070] [0:021;0:030] [ 0:099; 0:065]
Income mean  0:010  0:008 0:018
max (0:002) (0:002) (0:004)
[ 0:015; 0:006] [ 0:012; 0:004] [0:010;0:027]
Benets no 0:007 0:005  0:012
yes (0:003) (0:002) (0:004)
[0:002;0:012] [0:001;0:008] [ 0:020; 0:003]
Assets yes  0:008  0:006 0:014
no (0:003) (0:002) (0:005)
[ 0:014; 0:003] [ 0:011; 0:002] [0:005;0:025]
Political mean 0:033 0:018  0:051
interest very strong (0:003) (0:001) (0:004)
[0:028;0:037] [0:016;0:021] [ 0:058; 0:044]
Life mean 0:010 0:007  0:017
satisfaction max (0:002) (0:001) (0:003)
[0:007;0:014] [0:005;0:009] [ 0:023; 0:012]
Doctor mean 0:092 0:028  0:120
visits max (0:027) (0:003) (0:027)
[0:043;0:148] [0:020;0:033] [ 0:171; 0:066]
Year min  0:169  0:085 0:254
of birth max (0:025) (0:008) (0:033)
[ 0:217; 0:119] [ 0:101; 0:067] [0:186;0:315]
Mean eect, standard error in parentheses and 95% condence interval in brackets. Simulations with
Clarify based on table 9, ordered probit model. Results for the ordered logit model are available upon
request. To simulate the probabilities continuous variables were set to their means. Other covariates
were set to male, married, from West Germany, no immigrant, medium education (ISCED3/4/5),
working, not receiving any state benets but owning some kind of assets.
Table 4: Eect of Changes in Various Explanatory Variables on the Predicted
Probabilities for Immigration Concerns, Ordered Probit
17are predicted to be 17 percentage points less likely not to be concerned and
more than 25 percentage points more likely to be very concerned than the
oldest individuals. Consequently, the age pattern of predicted immigration
concerns is far more pronounced when holding constant year of birth than
when holding constant survey year, see gure 4.
Figure 4: Eect of Age on the Predicted Probabilities for Immigration Con-
cerns, Ordered Probit Including Year of Birth
Simulations with Clarify based on table 9, ordered probit model. Results for the ordered logit model are
available upon request. To simulate the probabilities continuous variables were set to their means. Other
covariates were set to male, married, from West Germany, no immigrant, medium education (ISCED
3/4/5), working, not receiving any state benets but owning some kind of assets.
The probability of being very concerned now increases up to age 80 and
is still quite high at age 90. Age appears to be quite a strong predictor of
immigration concerns: ceteris paribus an 80 year old is predicted to have an
about 10 percentage points lower probability of not being concerned and an
almost 20 percentage points higher probability of being very concerned than
a 20 year old. The comparison of gures 3 and 4 yields evidence for distinct
life cycle and cohort eects on immigration attitudes. Whereas older cohorts
seem to be less concerned about immigration, concerns grow over the life
cycle.
Table 8 has shown that there are signicant dierences in immigration
concerns across dierent years. As a robustness check, separate ordered pro-
bit models are estimated for each year.13 Since age and year of birth are
13The estimation results for this and the following two robustness checks are available
18perfectly collinear in each cross section, year of birth has to be excluded.
The estimated age eect thus confounds life cycle and cohort. The four age
terms are jointly signicant in seven out of ten years. There is no time trend,
however. Being highly educated is signicant in all years, as are immigration
background, gender, political interest and most concerns. All other variables
turn insignicant in some years. Also, being unemployed signicantly en-
hances immigration concerns in 2005 and 2006. Since unemployment rose in
2005, it is likely that individuals who became unemployed voiced signicantly
higher concerns.
An additional robustness check is estimating separate regressions for East
and West Germany. The age eect is estimated with far less precision for East
Germany. Since birth rates are much lower in East Germany, this conrms
the nding by Ivlevs (2008) that age is less signicant in regions with low
birth rates.
Additionally including a dummy for personal ownership of nancial assets
reveals that people who own nancial assets are less concerned. However, the
value of nancial assets has no signicant eect on immigration concerns.
The four age terms are still jointly signicant when controlling for ownership
of nancial assets.
Table 10 shows detailed regressions results for replacing the \no assets"
dummy by dummy variables for the ownership of dierent types of assets.
These types are savings accounts, building loans, life insurance, bonds, rm
capital and stocks. Whereas ownership of rm capital or stocks diminishes
immigration concerns, ownership of bonds or building loans enhances them.
The dierence between bond and stock holders is their willingness to take
risks, likely to be positively correlated with general open-mindedness, but
also their nancial literacy, positively correlated with education. However,
education is still highly signicant. Furthermore, the value of rm capital
is most clearly positively aected by an increase of domestic labor supply,
whereas the returns on bonds and building loans may not be related to labor
supply at all. The dierence between dierent types of assets is thus in line
with the theoretical results sketched in section 2.
The signs and signicance levels are the same across all three models
in tables 8 and 9. The sole problem with OLS is then that the quantita-
tive interpretation of the estimated coecients need not make much sense.
Nonetheless, gures based on the estimated coecients from the linear mod-
els are instructive because they conrm marked dierences between life cycle
and cohort eects on immigration attitudes.
Figure 5 shows the derivative of immigration concerns with respect to age
upon request.
19and its 95% condence interval. This is the combined marginal eect of all
four age terms. The left panel represents the OLS model which includes time
dummies as controls and the right panel shows the model which includes year
of birth. Whereas in the model with time dummies, the marginal eect of
age on immigration concerns is signicantly positive for a limited range of
ages only, it is positive up to age 80 and above when controlling for year of
birth. Note, however, that the gure only ranges from age 18 to age 85. For
very old ages, the marginal eect of age is subject to a lot of uncertainty.
Figure 5: Marginal Eect of Age on Immigration Concerns, Including Time
Dummies vs. Including Year of Birth
In summary, immigration concerns dier across time and between dier-
ent cohorts of individuals. There is also quite a strong life-cycle eect on
immigration concerns with individuals growing more concerned up to age 80.
However, age does not have a signicant impact on stated immigration con-
cerns in all years, and the age eect is estimated with less precision for East
than for West Germany. Highly educated individuals are least concerned
about immigration. Other labor market and welfare state related variables
are also signicant but quantitatively less important. Owners of assets with
variable returns, like rm capital and stocks, voice signicantly less concerns
about immigration. Among the non-economic variables, own immigration
background has the strongest positive impact on immigration attitudes.
20Stated Immigration Concerns: Within-Transformed Model
As an alternative way of isolating the eect of growing older on immigration
concerns, a model which only uses the within variation of the data, as in
equation (3), is compared to a pooled OLS model with a full set of time
variant controls. The within or FE model has the additional advantage that
it eliminates any unobserved heterogeneity between individuals which is time-
invariant. For these comparisons only individuals who remained in the panel
for at least two years are used.
Table 11 in the appendix displays complete regression results. The rst
column shows estimation results for OLS, leaving out the explanatory vari-
ables with little or no time variation (gender, immigration background, both
year of birth and time dummies, and living in East Germany). The number
of person-year observations is reduced only slightly to 171;636. Furthermore,
the overall R2 , the signs and signicance levels are comparable to the rst
column of table 8.14
Individuals remained on average 5:9 years in the sample, and the number
of individuals who spent at least two years in the panel is 29;299, such that
it should be possible to detect signicant life cycle eects. However, some
variables vary very little over the life cycle. Therefore, it is not surprising
that the within model has fewer signicant coecients than the pooled OLS
model. The four age terms are jointly signicant in both models.
Figure 6 illustrates the derivative of immigration concerns with respect
to age for the OLS and within models up to age 85. In the OLS model, age
has a signicantly positive (enhancing) eect on concerns between ages 40
and 60. Over the life cycle, growing older enhances immigration concerns
up to age 80 almost and it is signicant at the 5% level for a much larger
range of ages, see the right panel of gure 6. This is in line with the ordered
models and also with the pooled OLS model which includes birth year as a
control, see gure 5.
Although the dierences between the two columns in table 11 may in-
dicate that unobserved individual heterogeneity is indeed a problem, the
dierence in the estimated eect of age on immigration concerns is similar to
the one which is observed when comparing models with and without year of
birth as in gure 5: whereas in a pooled OLS model, the estimated eect of
age confounds growing older with belonging to a given cohort, the FE model
isolates the eect of growing older.
There are some additional dierences. The asset ownership dummy turns
insignicant in the within estimation. However, a robustness check (not dis-
14Only concerns about the environment turn insignicant, whereas being on maternity
leave turns signicant. The sizes of the estimated coecients change slightly.
21Figure 6: Marginal Eect of Age on Immigration Concerns, OLS vs. FE
played) has shown ownership of individual nancial assets to be signicant
over the life cycle. The argument that capital owners are less opposed to
immigration thus still seems to be valid. The impact of welfare state con-
cerns is partly conrmed: whereas the dummy for receiving state support is
signicant in both specications, income apparently has no eect over the
life cycle. Furthermore, individuals become less opposed as they rely more
heavily on the health system.
Life satisfaction and other concerns also have life cycle eects, with some
notable dierences for dierent areas of concerns: individuals who become
more concerned over the life cycle in any area also become more concerned
about immigration. Some variables with little within variation such as mar-
ital status, education and political interest are not signicant over the life
cycle.
Figure 7 illustrates the predicted value of immigration concerns as a func-
tion of age, based on the sample distribution of respondent characteristics by
age, also up to age 85. The OLS model predicts a hump-shaped age prole,
with immigration concerns most pronounced among the 70 year olds. Immi-
gration concerns over the life cycle are predicted to increase more sharply.
A predicted value of 2 corresponds to being somewhat concerned. The pre-
dicted value for the youngest individuals is about 1:8. Predicted concerns
reach a peak of about 2:2, also around age 70, and then decrease. Despite
changes in other characteristics over the life cycle, such as reliance on social
security, older individuals thus seem to feel more concerned about immigra-
22tion attitudes well into their retirement.
Figure 7: Predicted Immigration Concerns by Age, OLS vs. FE
Dierence in concerns
This section introduces an alternative measure for immigration concerns.
As discussed in section 3, immigration concerns are highly correlated with
other areas of concerns and also follow a similar age prole. Furthermore,
immigration and other concerns are likely to be jointly determined, such that
it is dicult to argue that being concerned about some other issue has an
exogenous impact on immigration concerns.
The rst column of table 12 in the appendix replicates the complete re-
gression results for the OLS model of stated immigration concerns with year
of birth included as a control. The second column excludes other concerns as
explanatory variables. Indeed, the model's explanatory power decreases quite
sharply.15 There are a few sign changes, suggesting that immigration con-
cerns measure more than just general worries. However, these sign changes
may also indicate that the two regressions are aected by endogeneity and
omitted variable bias, respectively.
15Adding selected variables like the frequency of eating out, or a dummy for whether
someone has a foreign parent, did not increase explanatory power much. Political party
preference was found to increase explanatory power but is likely to suer from similar
endogeneity problems as dierent areas of concerns.
23East Germans tend to voice more concerns than West Germans, includ-
ing more concerns about immigration. Being East German thus signicantly
enhances immigration concerns when other concerns are not accounted for.
Given other concerns, being East German reduces stated immigration con-
cerns. A similar eect is observed for the number of doctor visits: individ-
uals who visit a doctor more frequently voice more immigration concerns,
presumably because they are generally more concerned. When controlling
for other concerns, individuals with a higher number of doctor visits in the
three months prior to the interview stated less concerns about immigration.
Furthermore, household income turns insignicant as other concerns are ex-
cluded. Whereas respondents with higher incomes have less reason to be
concerned, concerns about the scal impact of immigration increase with
income, given other concerns.
The comparison of the rst two columns of table 12 also shows that the
estimated age pattern is strongly aected by the inclusion of other concerns
as controls. Year of birth is signicant with the opposite sign when exclud-
ing other concerns. That is, younger generations are estimated to be less
concerned about immigration.
The marginal eect of age also changes somewhat, see gure 8. In both
models the age eect is estimated with little precision below age 30. However,
there are also signicant dierences. When excluding other concerns the age
eect turns negative for somewhat younger ages (around age 70), and the
estimated negative eect for older ages is much stronger than in the model
which includes other concerns.
These changes could in principle be related to the strong multicollinear-
ity between age and year of birth since excluding other concerns leads to a
negative eect of birth year on immigration concerns but at the same time to
a stronger negative eect of age for very old ages, see gure 8. However, this
does not seem to be the problem, as a robustness check revealed: FE models
of stated immigration concerns were compared to between eects (BE) mod-
els, which only use the variation between individuals. These regressions were
run on the sample of individuals who remained in the panel for the whole
ten-year period. The estimated age eect in the BE models then corresponds
to a cohort eect. The BE models additionally allows for non-linearities in
the cohort eect.
However, the estimated cohort eect is not consistent across the two
models with and without other concerns excluded either.16 The distinct
estimated age and cohort eects are thus not robust to the exclusion of
additional concerns.
16These regression results are available upon request.
24Figure 8: Marginal Eect of Age on Immigration Concerns by Age, Including
vs. Excluding Other Concerns
To circumvent possible biases while separating immigration from other
concerns, the dierence between immigration concerns and average concerns
is used as a measure for immigration attitudes. This variable has over 30
dierent outcomes between  2 and 2 such that linear models seem appro-
priate. For about 10% of individuals the value of average concerns is exactly
equal to the value of immigration concerns.
The third and fourth column of table 12 show regression results for the
dierence between immigration and average concerns. Whereas the third
column includes year of birth as a control, the fourth column includes time
dummies. There are no large dierences in the estimated coecients between
the two models. Furthermore, many of the variables that have a signicant
impact on stated immigration concerns also have a signicant impact on this
alternative measure of immigration attitudes. There are a few exceptions.
Being East German, the frequency of doctor visits and household in-
come are signicant with the same sign as in the model which includes other
concerns as controls in the rst column, conrming the above discussion.
Additionally, higher life satisfaction reduces the relative prominence of im-
migration concerns. Individuals with low life satisfaction are likely to worry
about other things than immigration. However, year of birth is still signi-
cant with the opposite sign. Older cohorts thus seem to be more concerned
about immigration than about other issues. At the same time growing older
lessens concerns about immigration relative to other concerns, see the left
25panel of gure 9.
Figure 9: Marginal Eect of Age on the Dierence between Immigration and
Other Concerns by Age, Including Time Dummies vs. Including Year of
Birth
The comparison with the estimated age pattern from the model with
time dummies instead of year of birth, see the left panel of gure 9, con-
rms the existence of distinct cohort and life cycle eects. In this model age
signicantly enhances the importance of immigration relative to other issues
individuals may be concerned about, at least between ages 40 and 70. The es-
timated age coecients are likely to capture the negative eect of birth year.
The fourth column shows that immigration concerns were most prominent
relative to other issues in the base year 1999, and least prominent in 2003.
Note that 2003 was the year of the Iraq war and also the year far-reaching
labor market reforms were passed in Germany.
As a robustness check on the estimated age pattern, a within-transformed
model of the dierence in concerns is estimated and compared to the OLS
model. Regression results can be found in table 13 in the appendix. Figure
10 shows the marginal eect of age on the dierence in concerns in the two
models. The age pattern is consistent with gure 9: whereas the OLS model
which excludes both year of birth and time dummies estimates an enhancing
eect of age on the new measure of immigration concerns, the FE model in
the right panel shows a decline in immigration concerns over the life cycle.
The predicted dierence in concerns based on the sample distribution of
respondent characteristics is negative for all ages as gure 11 shows. Note
26Figure 10: Marginal Eect of Age on the Dierence in Concerns, OLS vs.
FE
that observed average concerns are also more pronounced than immigration
concerns for all ages, see gure 1. The OLS model predicts an increase in
the relative importance of immigration concerns with age, with a few dips in
between. The dip in concerns about immigration relative to other concerns
past age 60 is quite interesting. In terms of birth year, these are the cohorts
born shortly after World War Two. These cohorts may also be the rst to
enter retirement worrying about the future of pensions.
Over the life cycle, individuals are predicted to be most concerned about
immigration when they are young and least concerned when they are old.
There is a slight increase in concerns between ages 40 and 60, but around
age 60, predicted concerns are still much lower than around age 20.
In summary, using the dierence between immigration and other concerns
as a measure for immigration attitudes leads to predictions concerning the
impact of growing older and belonging to a given cohort which are contrary
to the predictions based on using stated immigration concerns. Over the life
cycle, stated immigration concerns are found to increase well into retirement
and decrease only as individuals approach the end of their lives. Meanwhile,
relative to other areas of concerns immigration concerns decrease over the
life cycle. Among older cohorts immigration is more prominent relative to
other issues than among young cohorts. However, the cohort eect on stated
immigration concerns is not robust.
27Figure 11: Predicted Dierence in Concerns by Age, OLS vs. FE
5 Conclusion
This analysis has attempted to disentangle the eect of individual age on
immigration attitudes from cohort and time eects to answer the question
whether people grow more averse to immigration over the life cycle. To
achieve this goal the paper followed two approaches. Firstly, year of birth
was included as a control in addition to individual age. Time dummies were
also included in some regressions instead of year of birth. Secondly, models
which use the within variation of the data only were estimated. Furthermore,
two dierent measures of immigration attitudes were analyzed.
Several presumptions concerning the impact of dierent individual char-
acteristics correlated with age were derived from previous theoretical re-
search. Firstly, older individuals who draw larger shares of their income
from (domestic) capital were presumed to be in favor of labor inows. This
presumption was not borne out for ownership of all types of capital, but
conrmed for rm capital, stocks and nancial assets in general.
Secondly, older individuals were presumed to be less concerned about
possible changes in the political balance induced by immigration. Indeed,
stated immigration concerns were found to decrease strongly after age 80
whereas relative to other concerns immigration concerns decrease over most
of the life cycle.
Thirdly, even with exible pension benets pensioners do not necessarily
favor labor immigration since it has osetting eects on the level of wages and
28the number of contributors. Workers may favor labor immigration if pension
contributions are adjustable to keep benets stable. In fact, no signicant
dierence between workers' and pensioners' attitudes was found, whereas
individuals outside the labor market for other reasons were found to be less
averse to immigration.
Fourthly, the contributors to welfare were presumed to be more opposed
to immigration than beneciaries, assuming that welfare contributions rather
than benets are adjustable. This presumption was also borne out: for
given education levels, individuals with high incomes were found to be more
concerned, whereas those who benet from some kind of state support or who
rely relatively heavily on the health system were found to be less concerned.
The predicted age prole of stated immigration concerns and of the dif-
ference between immigration and other concerns is non-linear. Over the life
cycle, individuals are predicted to state the highest concerns in their seven-
ties. However, relative to other issues, immigration causes most concerns at
young ages. At the same time, older cohorts were found to be more con-
cerned about immigration than about other issues. The eect of birth year
on stated immigration concerns is not consistent over dierent specications
Survey year also turned out to signicantly inuence immigration attitudes
with stated immigration concerns highest when unemployment is high.
The regressions which include other areas of concerns as explanatory vari-
ables seemed to suer from endogeneity problems. However, excluding these
other areas of concern may lead to an omitted-variable bias. Additionally,
the share of the variance in stated immigration concerns explained by the
other controls is quite low. The ndings in this paper thus suggest extending
the analysis by including additional variables, although this would come at
the cost of reducing the sample to non-random subsamples. Possibly, valid
exclusion restrictions for each area of concern could be found.
Although no pre-programed routines exist for estimating within-trans-
formations of ordered models, incorporating within-transformations is pos-
sible under certain assumptions, see, e.g., Frijters and Geishecker (2008).
Finally, the SOEP data can be disaggregated regionally when extended se-
curity provisions are satised. Linking the data to regional birth rates would
make it possible to verify the nding by Ivlevs (2008), that individuals in
areas with lower birth rates are less concerned about immigration, for Ger-
many.
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sVariable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Demographic characteristics
Age 179;828 47:90 17:43 18 100
Male 179;828 0:48 0:50 0 1
Married 179;828 0:60 0:49 0 1
Number kids in HH 179;828 0:51 0:88 0 10
East German 179;828 0:27 0:45 0 1
Immigrant 179;828 0:06 0:24 0 1
Education
Education (ISCED) 176;399 3:51 1:42 0 6
Labor force status
Working 179;828 0:59 0:49 0 1
Retired 179;828 0:18 0:39 0 1
In education 179;828 0:03 0:17 0 1
Unemployed 179;828 0:05 0:22 0 1
On maternity leave 179;828 0:02 0:13 0 1
Working irregularly 179;828 0:02 0:15 0 1
Not working (other) 179;828 0:11 0:31 0 1
Income
Gross HH income (yearly) 179;828 39513:95 38352:18 0 1;032;387
HH receives no benets 178;935 0:54 0:50 0 1
Assets
HH owns no assets 178;241 0:11 0:31 0 1
HH owns savings account 156;047 0:88 0:33 0 1
HH owns bonds 55;914 0:66 0:47 0 1
HH owns stocks 64;793 0:71 0:46 0 1
HH owns rm capital 28;957 0:34 0:48 0 1
HH owns building savings contract 179;701 0:45 0:50 0 1
HH owns life insurance 179;701 0:57 0:50 0 1
Owns nancial assets 35;379 0:48 0:50 0 1
Value nancial assets 13;881 31;524 111;887 1 6;000;000
Other variables
Political interest 179;616 2:69 0:80 1 4
Life satisfaction 179;539 6:93 1:78 0 10
Doctor visits (last 3 months) 179;202 2:58 4:14 0 99
Household income is deated to 2006. Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table 6: Summary Statistics for Control VariablesValue Denition
1 Primary education or rst stage of basic education
2 Lower secondary or second stage of basic education
3 (Upper) secondary education
4 Post-secondary non-tertiary education
5 First stage of tertiary education
6 Second stage of tertiary education
Table 7: International Standard Classication of Education
B Detailed Regression Results
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Age -0.00336 -0.00618 -0.0130
(0.0113) (0.0210) (0.0356)
Age2 0.0000204 0.0000315 0.000175
(0.000361) (0.000673) (0.00114)
Age3 0.00000131 0.00000256 0.00000217
(0.00000482) (0.00000899) (0.0000152)
Age4 -1.38e-08 -2.65e-08 -3.25e-08
(2.27e-08) (4.24e-08) (7.19e-08)
2000 -0.0803*** -0.149*** -0.250***
(0.00629) (0.0117) (0.0199)
2001 -0.160*** -0.294*** -0.495***
(0.00653) (0.0121) (0.0206)
2002 -0.0997*** -0.185*** -0.314***
(0.00657) (0.0122) (0.0208)
2003 -0.160*** -0.294*** -0.499***
(0.00695) (0.0129) (0.0220)
2004 -0.0637*** -0.117*** -0.199***
(0.00693) (0.0129) (0.0220)
2005 -0.00117 -0.0000432 -0.0000484
(0.00698) (0.0132) (0.0223)
2006 -0.0287*** -0.0526*** -0.0841***
(0.00697) (0.0130) (0.0221)
2007 -0.0461*** -0.0849*** -0.143***
(0.00713) (0.0133) (0.0226)
2008 -0.0972*** -0.181*** -0.300***
(0.00714) (0.0133) (0.0226)
Male 0.0869*** 0.163*** 0.278***
(0.00575) (0.0107) (0.0181)
Married 0.0384*** 0.0705*** 0.119***
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. HH income is the natural logarithm of real household income, adjusted for the number
of household members. The reference category for education is \in school". The reference category for labor
force status is \working". Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).continued from previous page
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
(0.00652) (0.0121) (0.0205)
Number kids in HH -0.0205*** -0.0382*** -0.0646***
(0.00371) (0.00689) (0.0117)
East German -0.0265*** -0.0513*** -0.0887***
(0.00678) (0.0125) (0.0213)
Immigrant -0.235*** -0.429*** -0.720***
(0.0108) (0.0200) (0.0340)
Isced 1 2 0.0536*** 0.0962*** 0.177***
(0.0191) (0.0358) (0.0613)
Isced 3 4 5 0.0173 0.0289 0.0625
(0.0191) (0.0358) (0.0613)
Isced 6 -0.188*** -0.349*** -0.578***
(0.0208) (0.0389) (0.0665)
Retired -0.00292 -0.00544 -0.00676
(0.0125) (0.0233) (0.0393)
In education -0.128*** -0.239*** -0.407***
(0.0138) (0.0260) (0.0445)
Unemployed 0.000433 -0.000232 -0.00589
(0.00959) (0.0179) (0.0306)
On maternity leave -0.0149 -0.0263 -0.0460
(0.0144) (0.0265) (0.0447)
Working irregularly -0.0385*** -0.0700*** -0.120***
(0.0128) (0.0236) (0.0404)
Not working (other) -0.0150* -0.0288* -0.0499*
(0.00865) (0.0160) (0.0270)
HH income 0.00506*** 0.00953*** 0.0152***
(0.00127) (0.00238) (0.00402)
Receives no benets 0.0175*** 0.0319*** 0.0551***
(0.00635) (0.0118) (0.0200)
Owns no assets 0.0196*** 0.0368*** 0.0658***
(0.00735) (0.0139) (0.0235)
Political interest 0.0442*** 0.0824*** 0.137***
(0.00339) (0.00639) (0.0109)
Life satisfaction -0.00834*** -0.0156*** -0.0264***
(0.00139) (0.00262) (0.00445)
Doctor visits -0.00181*** -0.00342*** -0.00592***
(0.000497) (0.000928) (0.00160)
Concerns
Economic Development 0.173*** 0.322*** 0.554***
(0.00380) (0.00706) (0.0122)
Environment -0.0127*** -0.0213*** -0.0373***
(0.00423) (0.00792) (0.0136)
Peace -0.0316*** -0.0594*** -0.107***
(0.00388) (0.00720) (0.0124)
Crime 0.409*** 0.742*** 1.296***
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. HH income is the natural logarithm of real household income, adjusted for the number
of household members. The reference category for education is \in school". The reference category for labor
force status is \working". Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).continued from previous page
Immigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
(0.00401) (0.00771) (0.0135)
Foreigner situation 0.0857*** 0.162*** 0.283***
(0.00398) (0.00754) (0.0132)
Own economic situation 0.0604*** 0.113*** 0.192***
(0.00370) (0.00687) (0.0117)








Observations 171,762 171,762 171,762
(Pseudo) R2 0.270 0.147 0.149
Joint signicance F(4;29424) = 4:79 2(4) = 19:28 2(4) = 16:54
of all age terms Prob > F = 0:0007 Prob > 2 = 0:0007 Prob > 2 = 0:0024
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. HH income is the natural logarithm of real household income, adjusted for the number
of household members. The reference category for education is \in school". The reference category for labor
force status is \working". Political interest ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table 8: Regression Results for Immigration Concerns, Including Time Dum-
mies, OLS vs. Non Linear ModelsImmigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Age 0.00155 0.00293 0.00204
(0.0113) (0.0209) (0.0355)
Age2 0.00000374 -0.000000720 0.000139
(0.000361) (0.000669) (0.00113)
Age3 0.00000152 0.00000294 0.00000257
(0.00000482) (0.00000894) (0.0000151)
Age4 -1.47e-08 -2.80e-08 -3.40e-08
(2.27e-08) (4.22e-08) (7.13e-08)
Year of birth 0.00442*** 0.00811*** 0.0140***
(0.000607) (0.00113) (0.00190)
Other controls yes yes yes
Observations 171,762 171,762 171,762
(Pseudo) R2 0.265 0.144 0.146
Joint signicance F(4;29424) = 19:21 2(4) = 75:36 2(4) = 74:20
of all age terms Prob > F = 0:0000 Prob > 2 = 0:0000 Prob > 2 = 0:0000
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for clustering at
the individual level. The other control variables are the same as in table 8, excluding time dummies.
Table 9: Regression Results for Immigration Concerns, Including Year of
Birth, OLS vs. Non Linear ModelsImmigration concerns OLS Ordered Probit Ordered Logit
Age 0.0122 0.0231 0.0367
(0.0123) (0.0229) (0.0390)
Age2 -0.00000135 -0.0000179 0.000107
(0.000390) (0.000730) (0.00124)
Age3 0.00000138 0.00000280 0.00000225
(0.00000519) (0.00000972) (0.0000165)
Age4 -1.31e-08 -2.56e-08 -2.90e-08
(2.44e-08) (4.57e-08) (7.77e-08)
Year of birth 0.0144*** 0.0268*** 0.0459***
(0.000756) (0.00142) (0.00241)
HH income 0.00435*** 0.00795*** 0.0130***
(0.00132) (0.00249) (0.00420)
HH receives no benets 0.0220*** 0.0403*** 0.0681***
(0.00675) (0.0127) (0.0214)
HH owns savings account -0.00914 -0.0168 -0.0319*
(0.00563) (0.0106) (0.0180)
HH owns building loan 0.0168*** 0.0316*** 0.0516***
(0.00548) (0.0102) (0.0173)
HH owns life insurance 0.00667 0.0143 0.0215
(0.00562) (0.0105) (0.0179)
HH owns bonds 0.0178*** 0.0343*** 0.0561***
(0.00610) (0.0113) (0.0191)
HH owns rm capital -0.0298*** -0.0553*** -0.0895**
(0.0113) (0.0211) (0.0359)
HH owns stocks -0.0297*** -0.0537*** -0.0925***
(0.00571) (0.0106) (0.0179)
Other controls yes yes yes
Observations 139,976 139,976 139,976
(Pseudo) R2 0.278 0.152 0.154
Joint signicance F(4;26150) = 95:38 2(4)375:22 2(4) = 374:87
of all age terms Prob > F = 0:0000 Prob > 2 = 0:0000 Prob > 2 = 0:0000
Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for clustering at the
individual level. The other control variables are the same as in table 8, excluding time dummies.
Table 10: Eects of Dierent Assets on Immigration Concerns, OLS vs. Non











Number kids in HH -0.0229*** -0.00833*
(0.00376) (0.00441)
Isced 1 2 0.0450** 0.00294
(0.0194) (0.0227)
Isced 3 4 5 0.0196 0.0202
(0.0194) (0.0217)








On maternity leave -0.0511*** -0.00175
(0.0144) (0.0121)
Working irregularly -0.0392*** -0.0227**
(0.0129) (0.0105)
Not working (other) -0.0350*** -0.0162**
(0.00866) (0.00791)
HH income 0.00694*** 0.00167
(0.00127) (0.00121)
HH receives no benets 0.0228*** 0.0104*
(0.00642) (0.00569)
HH owns no assets 0.0175** 0.00375
(0.00751) (0.00653)
Political Interest 0.0289*** -0.00151
(0.00338) (0.00306)
Life satisfaction -0.0104*** -0.00473***
(0.00140) (0.00119)
Doctor visits -0.00208*** -0.00193***
(0.000509) (0.000428)
Concerns
Economic development 0.182*** 0.0913***
(0.00359) (0.00291)
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is \in school". The reference category for labor force status is \working". Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).continued from previous page







Foreigner situation 0.0839*** 0.203***
(0.00400) (0.00318)
Own economic situation 0.0578*** 0.0374***
(0.00371) (0.00308)




Average time in panel 5.9 5.9
Overall R2 0.256 0.177
Within R2 0.122
Between R2 0.199
Joint signicance F(4;29298) = 5:79 F(4;29298) = 29:18
of all age terms Prob > F = 0:0001 Prob > F = 0:0000
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is \in school". The reference category for labor force status is \working". Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number kids in HH -0.0167*** -0.00876*
(0.00415) (0.00455)
Isced 1 2 0.0731*** 0.00663
(0.0213) (0.0235)
Isced 3 4 5 0.0408* 0.0284
(0.0213) (0.0226)








On maternity leave -0.0653*** 0.0108
(0.0154) (0.0126)
Working irregularly -0.0752*** -0.0319***
(0.0144) (0.0110)
Not working (other) -0.0443*** -0.0140*
(0.00957) (0.00820)
HH income 0.0114*** 0.00308**
(0.00138) (0.00125)
HH receives no benets 0.0330*** 0.0138**
(0.00716) (0.00590)
HH owns no assets 0.0127 0.00648
(0.00813) (0.00678)
Political interest 0.0429*** 0.0163***
(0.00387) (0.00317)
Life satisfaction 0.0107*** 0.0112***
(0.00152) (0.00121)
Doctor visits -0.00748*** -0.00476***
(0.000554) (0.000445)
continued on next page
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is \in school". The reference category for labor force status is \working". Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).continued from previous page
Dierence in concerns OLS FE
Observations 171,636 171,636
Individuals 29,299 29,299
Average time in panel 5.9 5.9
Overall R2 0.031 0.002
Within R2 0.003
Between R2 0.001
Joint signicance F(4;29298) = 9:16 F(4;29298) = 9:19
of all age terms Prob > F = 0:0000 Prob > F = 0:0000
Standard errors in parentheses. p < 0:10, ** p < 0:05, *** p < 0:01. The models account for
clustering at the individual level and include a constant. HH income is the natural logarithm of
real household income, adjusted for the number of household members. The reference category for
education is \in school". The reference category for labor force status is \working". Political interest
ranges from 1 (very strong) to 4 (none at all).
Table 13: Regression Results for the Dierence in Concerns, OLS vs. FE
47